Required Readings：

Lina M.Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710(2017).

Jean-Charles Rochet, and Jean Tirole, “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets”, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 1, n. 4, June 2003.

References：Robert Bork, Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, New York: Basic Books Inc. 

Presenter: Wang Yeliang, Doctoral Candidate, Class of 2019, Renmin University of China

Free Discussion:

Shen Weiwei, Director of the Big Data and Artificial Intelligence Law Research Center, China University of Political Science and Law：

      I have no background in economics at all, so the first paper is relatively easy for me to understand. Just as the speaker and moderator mentioned a moment ago, this article has generated quite a stir in legal academic circles.

      Despite the author’s young age, her analytical paradigm and arguments are highly subversive. The core logic underpinning this subversion lies in exploring the distinctions between online platforms and the conventional traditional enterprises that have long been the subject of our discussions, as well as how such differences transform the basic definition of monopoly and corresponding antitrust regulatory tools.

      Overall, I feel that when the author discusses predatory pricing and the ways to realize cost recoupment, she does not pay much attention to the factor of production. The article lists several reasons why predatory pricing is hard to identify under the law. For instance, a platform may adopt predatory pricing for one product while raising prices for others, or recoup its costs through other price discrimination mechanisms. However, to a certain extent, there is a prominent logic in the platform economy: once consumers are locked into the platform, they turn into producers. The cost recoupment mechanism derived from such user production seems worthy of more in-depth discussion, and this is one minor question I would like to raise. Coincidentally, I saw an article shared on WeChat Moments today from Beijing Cultural Review. It was written by Li Qiutong back in 2016, with the title “Surrender Privacy, Then Drain Our Wallets: How Much Surplus Value of Ours Remains to Be Extracted”. I find this perspective quite illuminating.

      Another point relates to considerations from a legal realist perspective. The paper analyzes why the Chicago School gained the upper hand amid competing antitrust discourses and theoretical debates, with numerous leading conservative and neoliberal figures taking part in these intellectual contests. Justice Powell was the most conservative justice on the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1970s. Many liberal American scholars travel frequently to Virginia to conduct research on him, as he was a native Virginian and the bulk of his archives are preserved at the Washington and Lee Library in Virginia. He stands as a central figure of the conservative revival, and at least two rulings cited in the paper are associated with him. Another figure mentioned is Bork, whose nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court was ultimately defeated—a highly prominent political event in the 1980s. His work The Antitrust Paradox also partially inspired the title of the paper under discussion. During the Reagan administration, the Chicago School rose to mainstream status. In the specific field of antitrust law, its advocacy of leniency toward vertical integration was deeply intertwined with the broader conservative resurgence sweeping the United States in the 1980s. This raises a critical question: within the U.S. institutional context, is stringent antitrust regulation targeting powerful platforms politically viable? Such debates may not remain purely academic. Instead, they risk becoming heavily politicized controversies, much like the long-running disputes over net neutrality.

Ding Xiaodong, Associate Professor, Renmin University of China Law School:

      First, I will recap the first paper. This paper discusses the issue of platform monopoly from two perspectives. The first perspective concerns practical legal application, specifically the regulation of Amazon. The author argues that Amazon acts opportunistically. When regulators intend to launch antitrust action against it, Amazon frames itself as an atypical platform enterprise and claims antitrust law does not apply to it. But once regulators treat Amazon as a special platform entity, it then asserts that it should be regulated as an ordinary business. Against this paradox, the author proposes two regulatory paths. The first is to subject Amazon to rigorous antitrust investigations, holding that platforms cannot claim special privileges simply because of their platform nature. The second path treats Amazon as public infrastructure. Under this approach, conventional antitrust investigations would not be carried out, or antitrust regulators would adopt a fundamentally different stance. Meanwhile, Amazon would be required to bear the mandatory obligations that all infrastructure operators must fulfill.

      The second dimension of this paper lies in the author’s dissatisfaction with the existing antitrust legal framework. The article elaborates on a shift in antitrust law: the transition from structuralism to the Chicago School. Simply put, structuralism can be interpreted as process-oriented regulation, which subjects the entire spectrum of corporate market conduct to supervision. In contrast, the Chicago School attaches far less importance to behavioral processes and centers its analysis on outcomes, arguing that the ultimate goal of competition policy is merely favorable results. The author, however, contends that this shift has overlooked numerous vital factors, leaving the foundational logic of modern antitrust law fundamentally flawed.

      I will skip detailed comments on the first dimension, since past reading sessions have centered on the topic of public infrastructure. I will briefly discuss the second dimension, which touches upon the foundational principles of antitrust law. The ideal theoretical framework of antitrust law assumes that all market actors are rational competitors who must neither shun competition nor engage in excessive competition. Collusion is a classic example of anti-competitive conduct, whereby multiple market participants coordinate their actions. Exclusionary practices such as predatory pricing, by contrast, constitute excessive competition, and both categories of conduct are subject to legal regulation. The Chicago School criticizes this traditional line of reasoning, arguing that these various market behaviors are closely interrelated and that heavy-handed legal intervention yields only marginal practical benefits. The School thus concludes that a cautious approach ought to be adopted in antitrust regulation. In my view, even though the core premises of the Chicago School may not hold entirely true, its critiques carry substantial persuasive force. The structuralist antitrust regime that predated the Chicago School was excessively formalistic and out of touch with the actual dynamics of market competition.

Xiong Bingwan, Associate Professor, Renmin University of China Law School:

      These two papers are quite thought-provoking. Yesterday was Double 11, and I visited a platform enterprise to experience its Double 11 corporate culture, where I learned a new term: “Douyin merchant”. Business models nowadays evolve at an extremely rapid pace. Turning back to these two readings, one direct question arises: how should we evaluate competitive dynamics among e-commerce firms within a fast-changing digital economy market?

      In my opinion, whether to adopt structuralism or outcome-oriented analysis to judge whether an enterprise’s conduct or market position constitutes monopolization depends on specific factual contexts. In particular, a noteworthy issue highlighted in this paper is cross-border competition. At present, we have a wide variety of e-commerce platforms including Tmall, Taobao, JD.com, Pinduoduo and numerous social commerce channels. Looking back at the evolution of e-commerce: the early stage centered on products, followed by a shift toward service supremacy, while today many argue that user attention has become the core competitive resource — this is exactly the logic behind Douyin merchants. Platforms now convert user attention into consumption and tap into consumers’ latent purchasing willingness and potential. Many people are familiar with the live-streaming influencer Li Jiaqi, whose product recommendation videos carry tremendous influence; goods tend to sell out the moment he promotes them. This brings us a thought-provoking question: Is rivalry between modern platforms still defined as competition over product sales channels? And will this transformation affect the standards adopted in competition policy assessments?

      Another noteworthy phenomenon is the rise of aggregated ride-hailing platforms such as Amap Ride-Hailing, which integrate numerous large and small ride-hailing service providers. These new aggregator platforms can consolidate fragmented small players to generate aggregation effects, thereby reshaping the competitive landscape.

      A brief review of the dramatic development history of e-commerce platforms dating back to 2000 reveals a clear pattern: some platforms that once held dominant market positions remain powerful to this day, yet countless others have faded away, constantly replaced by emerging competitors. Douyin merchants and Pinduoduo are typical cases in point. From another angle, online platforms in Europe and the United States evolve and renew at a far slower pace. The Douyin merchant model has achieved large-scale development in China, while no comparable large-scale equivalent has taken shape in the United States. This demonstrates that different socioeconomic contexts will fundamentally shape one’s judgment of market conditions.

Liu Ming:

      I have attended this reading seminar several times, and every time I come here, I truly come with a mindset of learning. Professors Ding and Xiong have selected a great number of high-quality papers for our reading sessions. When I used to read foreign academic literature on my own, I was often confused about which papers were seminal and which ones were mediocre. Quite often, I could only tell the quality of a paper after finishing reading it in full. This reading seminar on cyberlaw curates a set of classic readings for all participants, and I regard it as an excellent platform for academic

      I majored in civil law, so I am a complete layman when it comes to economics and competition law. Nevertheless, my daily work frequently compels me to reflect on competition issues involving digital platforms. The greatest merit of the first paper lies in its breakthrough from established analytical paradigms. If we dare to think more radically and explore a brand-new paradigm, we may well pose a fundamental question: what exactly does competition between platforms entail?

      Platform competition comprises two layers. On one hand, it is competition over virtual digital storefronts; on the other hand, its core essentially revolves around traffic competition, where traffic entry points represent an emerging form of rivalry. I believe this offers us a fresh perspective when analyzing market competition dynamics. Competition between platforms differs fundamentally from rivalry among traditional enterprises, where relevant markets are relatively stable and competition only occurs between two established players within the same market segment. In the internet industry, market giants are often disrupted not by their direct competitors. Simply replicating an existing business model rarely succeeds unless the entrant can invest vastly greater capital. 

      Disruption of market dominators usually stems from a paradigm shift — such a shift involves not merely changes in economic logic, but also transformative evolution of business models. As we can observe today, numerous new e-commerce platforms keep emerging. Even when established players already command the lion’s share of the market, new platforms and fresh growth drivers can still take root precisely on account of innovative business models. From my observation, competition within the internet and platform economy is no longer a straightforward head-on contest; instead, rivals often compete via indirect, circuitous approaches, which I believe marks a fundamental shift. Furthermore, the two-sided market nature of platforms prompts us to rethink the definition of vertical market relationships. We need to examine whether the tie between merchants and platforms equates to traditional vertical arrangements . 

      This explains why competition among platforms has become a hotly debated topic and sparked discussions about paradigm shifts in traditional competition law research. Their business models and competitive strategies diverge drastically from those of conventional enterprises. Such disparities create a demand for theoretical innovation. That is exactly why I came to today’s seminar — to refresh and enrich my knowledge. 

Editor:Xu Liuya

Reviewer: Zhu Peiwen